Securing an international major event is a daunting challenge, and it certainly involves an array of complex issues that must be carefully addressed.
All the elements of the security industry, both public and private sectors, become involved in securing major events. They all need skilled project managers with a meticulous eye for detail and adroit budgeting and logistical strategies, to ensure they develop and implement appropriate operational models and structures to achieve their objectives.
A security challenge
Obviously, ensuring effective security operations for an international major event - such as a Commonwealth Games - across a wider metropolitan area is more challenging than merely securing a single venue for a particular event like a rugby test match.
Securing a mega-event like the FIFA World Cup, IRB Rugby World Cup, an ICC World Cricket Cup or a summer Olympic Games presents significantly more challenges than those posed by less complex major events. (A Commonwealth Games, an All-Africa Games or an IAAF World Athletics or other international federation world championship are essentially delivered in just one city and its environs.)
What is a mega-event?
A mega-event holds competition fixtures and related activities across a nation and in many instances even schedules competitions or functions in neighbouring countries.
There is general agreement on the definitions of a major event, an international major event and a mega-event. The 2010 FIFA World Cup clearly meets all the criteria to be classified as an international mega-event. Namely, the event will:
* Involve the participation of a wide array of international teams and their spectators.
* Involve the dedicated fit-out and use of multiple competition and non-competition venues.
* Take place in multiple cities.
* Have a truly international broadcast audience.
There are a few truisms in relation to the security of a mega-event - and these need to be accepted by key stake-holders in government, the private sector and the general public. As with all security challenges it is possible to adopt a zero tolerance approach to crime but it is impossible to achieve a zero crime outcome.
Due to the scale and duration of the event, if for no other reason, serious crimes will occur during the event period. Because of the event's scope and duration, it is likely there will be deaths caused by criminal activity in event cities during the period of a mega-event.
The aims of security planning
The principal aim of security planning and operations is to insulate the event from the wider criminal environment. That is, the aim is to ensure there are no deaths or significant criminal incidents within the actual operational 'footprint' of the mega-event; and that the reputation of the event and the host city (or cities) is not marred by criminality, especially terrorism.
It is imperative that an extensive and comprehensive planning regime is developed and implemented for a mega-event - with a very strong focus on crime prevention. Ultimate responsibility for this security planning actually lies with the event organising committee.
In hosting the event, the committee will have signed and accepted a range of contractual responsibilities with the event owner for the purpose of being awarded the 'franchise' to run the event. A further condition of being awarded the 'franchise' involves an event organising committee obtaining and including in its bid a number of guarantees from its government - at Head of State and Ministerial level - including a government guarantee to provide all practical and necessary security assistance.
All of these arrangements are reasonably straightforward. However, the devil is most certainly in the detail.
Bid committees are created to compete for and try to win the right to hold major or mega-events. If its candidature is successful, a bid committee closes down; and an organising committee is incorporated and commences the detailed planning to deliver the event.
There is often some overlap between the membership of a bid committee and a subsequent organising committee, but they do not necessarily have identical memberships, attitudes and goals. A bid committee is fundamentally focused on winning the event and its performance indicators are accordingly simple and clear.
All mega-events require each competing bid to go into details concerning all proposed aspects of the respective bid and include these in the bid book: the (sports) program; the venues; the 'look' of the event; broadcasting and media; accreditation systems; transport arrangements; security; and the legacies of successfully hosting the event. However, the bid book is not an operating plan.
Forecasting the security budget
In recent years the resources specified in successful bid documents for security at mega-events have proven to be grossly inaccurate, substantially under-estimating the cost. For example the Sydney 2000 Olympic bid book stated a figure of AUD$32 million was required for security. The eventual cost to both the Australian and New South Wales governments was over AUD$430 million. This excludes salaries for police, military and public servants. The Athens 2004 Olympic Games expended over US$1,2 billion on security -nearly 400% more than had been estimated in its bid book.
The Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games bid committee estimated approximately CD$20 million would be sufficient for its security budget. It had not sufficiently consulted with the Canadian Federal Government on this particular issue and the security budget became a controversial and vexed subject in the early planning stages. The total 2010 security expenditure could possibly be 500% higher than the bid estimate.
The 2012 London Olympic Games bid committee had estimated a budget of approx. £30 million would be sufficient for its needs. The organising committee, Olympic Delivery Authority and Home Office are now refining their estimates and a total figure of over £400 million is likely to prove closer to the mark.
There are several contributing factors for the large disparities between bid security estimates and the reality of mega-event security implementation:
* Bid committees are focused on trying to win the bid and capture the event - not on the detailed expenses associated with critical ancillary services such as transport and security.
* Mega-event owners are not unduly concerned by the lack of fiscal detail in bid budget projections, provided financial facilities are clearly documented regarding the financing of venues. Event owners consider contractually binding organising committee and governmental guarantees, concerning the delivery of security, to ensure any shortfalls and inadequacies will be addressed. An exception is FIFA which has adopted a more exacting regime that gives it direct involvement in funding venue infrastructure.
* Some bid committees may consider that fully and accurately costing security into bid estimates might prove detrimental to the support, both governmental and public, they need to generate for the bid. In any case, the host government will have no option but to eventually make good any related budget deficit due to the contractual guarantees that have been signed and committed.
* There is rarely comprehensive scoping completed as a basis for the security budget estimates included in bids and the estimated figures routinely reflect only the key security tasks that the organising committee will deliver and not the additional costs borne by police and other agencies.
A major problem arises with any assumption that a government will step in and fill all major security gaps associated with sporting events. There is always a requirement for the procurement of significant private security resources. Governments, almost universally, will supplement the event security operation with police and even military forces deployed on event related duties that are commensurate with their skills, experience and legislative authority. But they will normally not deploy police or military to undertake the full gamut of security roles and responsibilities. There are two main reasons for this.
Firstly, police services are invariably under resource pressures due to their various community and law enforcement commitments. Therefore, it is often difficult to redeploy significant numbers of police from those duties to undertake special event security roles for any protracted period while still maintaining the necessary service levels to the community. For example, the New South Wales Police had 13 000 sworn officers at the time of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games duties and barely managed to deploy 4700 - approximately 35% of them - for the peak period of games duties. In order to redeploy that many sworn personnel, the police service had to cancel all police leave, training courses and approved secondary employment commitments. Unsurprisingly, security resources at those games still needed to be supplemented by over 5000 Australian military personnel (who undertook vehicle checking/screening duties and other specialised tasks such as counter-terrorism and EOD response deployments), 1500 security volunteers and nearly 5000 private security guards.
Secondly, a number of the security functions required for mega-events are services that can be performed at professional service levels by private security without diverting police officers from their more important law enforcement roles. These services include perimeter security patrolling and responses, access control and accreditation screening, CCTV and EACS monitoring, general asset protection, field of play protection, as well as spectator and vehicle marshalling.
Determining the resource needs
One of the key issues for an organising committee is to determine its anticipated security resource needs at an early stage in the planning process. However, before that can be done to useful effect, it is essential for an organising committee to discuss and agree with the government the respective roles and responsibilities its agencies and services will undertake in delivering the security model. This framework agreement then becomes the basis for further detailed security planning.
There are different models that are employed in various parts of the globe. Certainly at major events which are in effect political summits (like G8, APEC, CHOGM, NATO and ASEAN) the security forces used are almost entirely governmental resources, predominantly police, and the operation is normally under police command. However, even at these 'non-spectator' events, the access control points and X-ray duties are often delivered by contractors under police supervision.
At sporting major and mega-events the participation of the police and other government agencies can markedly vary. Major event security can predominantly be a private security operation with public sector resources deployed more sparingly, consistent with established statutory powers and sometimes on a cost recovery basis to the organising committee. Some mega-event models also involve a predominantly private security operation, albeit with a higher degree of governmental support. However, due to hosting contractual guarantees, police resources are rarely, if ever, provided to a mega-event on a cost-recovery basis.
The model used by the French for the 1998 FIFA World Cup involved the organising committee managing the event security operation and most of the staff in venues being contracted security staff while the police and other agencies undertook discreet supporting roles, principally outside the venues. While very successful, this French model remains the exception rather than the rule in the context of mega-event security planning.
The 2002 FIFA World Cup in Korea/Japan was predominantly secured by governmental resources. The two organising committees (Korea and Japan) contained small high-level security planning cells to project manage the interface with police and other government agencies; and to scope, tender and manage the private security requirements for the event.
Given the stature and size of mega-events, their relevance to the international reputation of a country, as well as the previously mentioned guarantees, the host government usually makes a substantial contribution to planning and delivering the security model. And it is generally accepted the overall security commander will be the relevant police commissioner. Notwithstanding this greater engagement by police, there is still normally a dual model of security at mega-events as the police rarely have the capacity to provide all the necessary manpower. Nor, as noted above, is there any rational basis for police to undertake all the security functionality for the event.
Security management in the organising committee
Organising committees for mega-events routinely appoint a coordinator of security to manage a small specialist security directorate. Among other duties, the directorate plans the private security inputs that will complement the government security operation.
The organising committee will rely on its security directorate to undertake the appropriate liaison with the police and other agencies in developing and implementing the model. This directorate will have the responsibility for ensuring the security C4i (command, control, communication, computing and intelligence) framework will meet the needs of the organising committee and be integrated, or at least appropriately aligned, with the police operation.
For example, it needs to ensure there is an agreed conduit for security intelligence to be conveyed into the organising committee's Main Operations Centre (MOC) at event-time; that there is an appropriate alignment of radio systems and bandwidths between venue staff and security personnel at venues; that the crisis management planning and business continuity planning for the event are developed and rehearsed (usually in close cooperation with police and other emergency responders).
Other key tasks a security directorate routinely undertakes include preparing tender specifications and managing procurement services in relation to activities such as:
* Venue security overlay design and fit-out.
* The development of event-specific risk assessments.
* Preparation or updating of venue emergency management plans.
* Private security guarding and equipment contracts.
Key risk
A key risk for a mega-event is that there might be insufficient skilled and qualified private security resources readily available for the critical tasks. Once the police resources and capabilities to be made available for the event have been estimated, it is critical to determine the gap that private security will have to fill. Similar to police resources, there are always extant demands and commitments on the private security industry.
The level of real availability will be determined by existing contractual commitments; determining how many private security guards are part-time personnel with other (full-time) job responsibilities; and how many personnel in the industry are actually registered on the books (as sub-contractors) with multiple guarding service providers.
It is very important to complete this scoping task early, so that planning can proceed on a firm footing and options can be developed to address identified shortfalls.
It should also be noted, any country hosting a mega-event will experience keen competition for quality guarding services at event time as other customers, separate to the organising committee and event venues, will enter the market. Other clients will contract event-related security services, including guarding services. These include:
* Owners/operators of critical infrastructure.
* Visiting teams.
* Event sponsors.
* Broadcasters and media.
* Various businesses and corporations holding functions to capitalise on the event experience.
These and other event-related clients will collectively make a significant impact on the private security market. Therefore the sooner the organising committee can develop its security resources plan, and tender and procure its guarding requirements, the more likely it will succeed in implementing a solid and effective security model. This can also insulate the organising committee from rising cost pressures on private security resources as the market tightens closer to the event.
The recent Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games resolved its private security needs relatively late and therefore contracted in an environment of diminishing resources.
It encountered challenges in obtaining the numbers it planned to use and also had limited training time to get the contractors' personnel appropriately prepared for their assigned tasks. The outcome was arguably acceptable but there were public criticisms concerning inconsistent access control at venues and the high level of 'no-shows' by private security guards.
These risks need to be addressed in organising committee contracts that contain financial penalties for both poor performance and unacceptable no-show rates.
Key opportunities
There are always key business and operational risks in seeking to successfully deliver security at mega-events. However, there are also significant opportunities for both private and public sector security services.
Apart from significant commercial opportunities for the private sector, some of the strategic legacies include security capability building, skills enhancement, equipment renewal and an improved public-private security alignment.
There is plenty of 'blue-sky' for all participants in the security operation, big and small, from both the public and private sectors. However, the keys to success are to start your planning early and implement a robust project management methodology.
Neil Fergus is the chief executive of Intelligent Risks (IR) P/L, Australia's leading international security consultancy that operates in over 50 countries. He is an internationally recognised terrorism and mega-event security expert. IR's international major event experience includes Olympic Games, Asian Games, Pan-American Games, Commonwealth Games, ICC and FIFA World Cups, as well as APEC, NATO and Islamic summits. IR delivers Major Event Security Management (MESM) training, on behalf of the US State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, to numerous countries hosting major events. He can be contacted at [email protected] or visit www.irisks.com.
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